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NO AID, NO AGENCY
Steven K. Green*

ABSTRACT
Over the past three decades, members of the Supreme Court have demonstrated
increasing hostility to the Establishment Clause’s rule against funding religion, first
enunciated in 1947. Over the years, the Court has not only narrowed the rule to allow
for government aid to flow to religious schools and faith-based charities, it has more
recently declared that to enforce that rule may amount to discrimination against religion. This Article argues that a key reason for the decline in the no-aid principle rests
on the weakness of the rationale underlying that rule: that funding of religion coerces
the conscience of taxpayers. The taxpayer conscience rationale, though valid historically as basis for the clause’s prohibition on government funding of religion, no
longer makes sense. And because the taxpayer conscience rationale is wanting, so
too is the Flast v. Cohen rule permitting taxpayer standing to challenge government
disbursements to religious entities. This Article then proposes an alternative basis for
the no-aid principle, that being the concept that government has “no agency” over
religious matters, a theory originally enunciated by James Madison. As explained,
the no-agency theory is a structural or jurisdictional limitation on the power of government to finance inherently religious activity. If adopted, the no-agency rationale
would restore needed credibility to the no-aid principle.
INTRODUCTION
To state the obvious, the Supreme Court’s decisions prohibiting government
financial aid to religious institutions have been controversial since the Court’s first
holding in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.1 There, a unanimous Court embraced the “no-aid” theory underlying the Establishment Clause despite a bare majority
upholding the aid in question: state reimbursements for transportation costs for students to travel safely to parochial schools.2 Speaking for the majority, Justice Hugo
Black wrote: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
* Fred H. Paulus Professor of Law and Director, Center for Religion, Law and Democracy,
Willamette University. My thanks to Ira C. Lupu, Steven Smith, Mark Storslee, Micah
Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1
See generally 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2
See id. at 16–17.
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they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”3 Justice Black reconciled the apparent
inconsistency between his rhetoric and the ruling by asserting that the aid was a
neutral “public welfare” benefit, generally available to students attending public and
private schools and that in the end, “[t]he State contributes no money to the [parochial] schools.”4 The dissenters, in contrast, viewed the no-aid rule in absolute
terms, with Justice Wylie Rutledge arguing that “[t]he prohibition broadly forbids
state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws
all use of public funds for religious purposes.”5
Conservative commentators—both political and religious—excoriated the Justices
for their rhetoric,6 as commentators did for later decisions affirming the principle of
“no-aid separationism.”7 In addition to arguing that a no-aid stance was counter to the
purpose of the First Amendment, the intent of its drafters, and the later historical
practice, critics insisted that religious schooling, and then religion-based charities,
provided essential services that benefitted the commonweal and were deserving of
public support.8
Notwithstanding that criticism, the Court proceeded to reaffirm the bona fides
of no-aid separationism in holdings through the mid-1980s.9 Over the past thirty
years, however, criticism of the no-aid rule has become more pronounced as new
adjudicative theories have emerged to challenge the pedigree of no-aid separationism:
neutrality, private choice, and more recently, non-discrimination. During that time
3

Id. at 15–16 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
Id. at 17–18.
5
Id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
6
See generally WILFRID PARSONS, S.J., THE FIRST FREEDOM: CONSIDERATIONS ON
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1948); JAMES M. O’NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as a
National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1949); John Courtney Murray, Law
or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949).
7
E.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and
the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285, 289 (1999).
8
See PARSONS, supra note 6, at 148–63; Corwin, supra note 6, at 17–21; Murray, supra
note 6, at 24.
9
See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973)
(holding that New York’s financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools violated the Establishment Clause); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973) (holding
that Pennsylvania’s tuition reimbursement program was unconstitutional because systems
of state aid to nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 372–73 (1975) (holding that Pennsylvania’s provisions providing auxiliary services
and textbook loans to nonpublic schools were impermissible aid); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (finding that two programs in the Grand Rapids School District
that provided classes to nonpublic school students with public funds violated the Establishment
Clause); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985) (finding that New York City’s program
that monitored and provided salaries of public school employees who also taught at parochial
schools violated the Establishment Clause).
4
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we have witnessed the dismantling of the no-aid rule resulting in, to use Professor
Ira Lupu’s phrase, the “lingering death of separationism.”10 That slow demise has
been evident in a series of cases that began in the late 1980s and has continued until
the present: Bowen v. Kendrick;11 Zobrest v. Catalina School District;12 Rosenberger
v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia;13 Agostini v. Felton;14 Mitchell
v. Helms;15 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris;16 Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer;17 and
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.18 Coupled with the erosion of no-aid
jurisprudence has been the Court’s tightening of the public’s ability to challenge the
government’s disbursements of financial assistance to religious institutions, represented by the narrowing of jurisprudential “standing” requirements.19 In the process,
Justices have expressed outright hostility to the Court’s own no-aid jurisprudence,
with Justice Scalia once comparing the no-aid rule (enforced through the “Lemon
test”) to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie,”20 and Justice Thomas condemning
the rule as having “a ‘brooding omnipresence,’”21 and of being “born of bigotry.”22
The Court’s retreat from the no-aid rule, if not complete disregard for it, was
evident in Mitchell v. Helms, where the Court upheld myriad forms of public aid to
religious (and public) schools, aid that had the potential of being diverted for religious uses.23 The plurality, speaking through Justice Thomas, declared that:
[I]f the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion,
to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say
that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of
furthering that secular purpose.24
10

See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230 (1994).
11
See generally 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
12
See generally 506 U.S. 1 (1993).
13
See generally 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
14
See generally 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
15
See generally 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
16
See generally 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
17
See generally 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
18
See generally 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
19
See generally Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
20
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
21
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2263 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
22
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000).
23
See id. at 832–36.
24
Id. at 810 (citation omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 245–47 (1968)).
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The “government itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination”
that might occur with the public aid.25 Under such circumstances, Thomas wrote, it
was “a mystery what the constitutional violation would be.”26
This retreat can be seen in the more recent holdings in Trinity Lutheran Church
v. Comer27 and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.28 In Trinity Lutheran,
a seven-Justice majority overturned a state’s refusal to provide a reimbursement
grant to a church for renovating its physical property.29 Rather than characterizing
the state’s refusal in terms of adherence to the no-aid rule, the majority held that the
state had discriminated against the church in not providing the financial benefit.30
The fact that the grant had a discrete and non-ideological application—to purchase
playground resurfacing materials—no doubt ameliorated the concerns of moderate
Justices Breyer and Kagan,31 with the former characterizing the grant as falling
under “a general program designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of
children” that could not be diverted for religious uses.32 Still, the Court majority all
but ignored the obvious no-aid question raised by allowing a state to provide a direct
monetary grant to a house of worship and the precedent that decision would set. The
Court’s disregard for the no-aid rule and its adoption of a non-discrimination principle in its stead led to Justice Sotomayor’s impassioned dissent which excoriated
the majority for its “silence” on the no-aid issue:
25

Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 827. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor called the plurality’s opinion one of
unprecedented breadth for the evaluation of Establishment Clause challenges to government school-aid programs. Reduced to its essentials,
the plurality’s rule states that government aid to religious schools does
not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on
a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content. The plurality also rejects
the distinction between direct and indirect aid, and holds that the actual
diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the advancement of its
religious mission is permissible.
Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
27
See generally 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
28
See generally 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
29
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2025.
30
Id. at 2024.
31
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry P. McDonald, Eviscerating Healthy Church-State
Separation, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2019) (“[T]he seemingly innocuous facts
of the Trinity Lutheran case itself, involving as it did funding for playground resurfacing,
may have played a key role in the Court’s decision.”).
32
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Further assuaging the possible concerns of Justices Breyer and Kagan was the Court’s footnote
declaring that “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with
respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms
of discrimination.” Id. at 2024 n.3 (majority opinion).
26
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The Court today profoundly changes [the church-state] relationship by holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires
the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its
decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a
separation of church and state beneficial to both.33
In Espinoza, which considered a state constitutional provision prohibiting financial assistance to religion, the Court majority again subordinated the values
embedded in the no-aid principle to those of the Free Exercise Clause.34 There was
no discussion about the merits of the no-aid principle or how it might advance
religious freedom writ-large; instead, Chief Justice Roberts boldly declared that “we
do not see how the [state] no-aid provision promotes religious freedom.”35 The
concurring opinions of Justices Thomas and Alito went even further in dismissing
the principle, with Thomas openly disputing that “the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from favoring religion or taking steps to promote it,”36 and Alito
tying the no-aid principle to a legacy of anti-Catholic animus.37
No doubt, the cumulative weight of the legal and policy arguments against noaid separation has precipitated the demise of the principle. This Article offers an
additional reason for the decline in no-aid separationism: the fundamental weakness
of the rationale that has undergirded the no-aid principle since the Court embraced
it in 1947. That rationale is, of course, that to use tax money to pay for religious activity
infringes on the conscience rights of taxpayers. In tracing the historical background
to the First Amendment in his Everson opinion, Justice Black noted how religious
“dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored
churches.”38 As Justice David Souter later described the rationale, “[C]ompelling an
individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle of freedom of
conscience.”39 Accordingly, “[a]ny tax to establish religion is antithetical to the
command ‘that the minds of men always be wholly free.’”40 This taxpayer conscience rationale has been so ubiquitous in court opinions and commentary that it has
achieved a canonical status in First Amendment jurisprudence.41 It finds its basis,
33

Id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
35
Id. at 2261.
36
Id. at 2265 (Thomas, J., concurring).
37
Id. at 2267–73.
38
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10 (1947).
39
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
40
Id. at 871 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 12); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declaring that people “have a clear stake as taxpayers in
assuring that they not be compelled to contribute even ‘three pence . . . of [their] property for
the support of any one establishment’”).
41
See Paul G. Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1,
34
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as Justices Black and Rutledge asserted in their opinions, in the founding generation’s reaction to the abuses associated with religious tax assessments. For Justices
Black and Rutledge, that revulsion was exemplified in the writings of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison. Jefferson, Justice Rutledge noted, declared that “no
man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever”;42 Justice Black also cited to Jefferson’s religious liberty bill:
“[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.”43 This “taxpayer conscience
rationale” has been the animating force behind the no-aid theorem because, in the
words of Erwin Chemerinsky and Barry McDonald, “deeply ingrained in the history
of American religious freedom is a fight against coerced taxpayer funding of religious
communities to protect rights of religious conscience and a healthy separation of
church and state.”44
To be sure, the idea that it violates rights of conscience to compel someone to
pay for another’s religion held saliency during the colonial and early national periods,
9 (1961) (“It is clear also that the conscience of individuals should not be coerced by forcing
them to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or religious activities.”); PAUL G.
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1964) (“[I]t is a violation of religious liberty
to compel people to pay taxes to support religious activities or institutions.”); Jesse H. Choper,
The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 267 (1968)
(The Establishment Clause’s “paramount purpose then, like its major concern today, was to
safeguard freedom of worship and conscience—in a word, to protect religious liberty.”);
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
351 (2002) (“Establishment of religion, the Framers’ generation thought, often had the effect
of compelling conscience. . . . [T]he Framers’ generation worried that conscience would be
violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose
beliefs they disagreed.”); Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L.
REV. 317, 318 (2011) (“A traditional argument against state financial support for religion is
that such support violates taxpayers’ freedom of conscience. Just as compelling religious speech
or worship infringes on religious liberty so, too, does requiring citizens to pay for religious
expressions they find objectionable.”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and
the Establishment Clause, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 653 (2019) (“‘Going beyond compulsory church attendance or required forms of worship, the Framers’ generation worried that
conscience would be violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed.’ In short, no reasonable person of that era would
dispute that it violated freedom of conscience to be conscripted into financially supporting
a religion not one’s own.”).
42
Everson, 330 U.S. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 12 HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823)).
43
Id. at 13 (majority opinion) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, supra note 42, at 84).
44
Chemerinsky & McDonald, supra note 31, at 1009; see also LAURENCE H. WINER &
NINA J. CRIMM, GOD, SCHOOLS, AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING: FIRST AMENDMENT CONUNDRUMS 182 (2015) (“Compelling taxpayers to provide such subsidies that support religion,
especially one not their own, and particularly when their subsidies are used for the religious
education and indoctrination of children, violates freedom of conscience and is intrinsically
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”).
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but it makes little sense as the animating theory for the no-aid principle in the twentyfirst century (or in the twentieth century, for that matter). This Article argues that the
tenuous logic, if not outright fallacy, of a conscience-based rationale for barring expenditures from general tax funds for religious activities has undermined the efficacy
of the no-aid principle. Though many well-meaning separationists have convinced
themselves that a tax-generated government expenditure in support of religious
education violates their conscience rights, they have been deceived.45 The primacy
of the tax compulsion rationale of the no-aid principle has had the unintended
consequence of forestalling the full development of other theories instructing against
government financial support for religion: dependency; competition/divisiveness;
manipulation/corruption; and, as this Article will discuss, the jurisdictional theory
of no-agency.46
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the origins of the “no compelled support of religion” argument for forbidding government financial support
of religion. During the colonial and early national periods, tax assessments and
distraint of property were the hallmarks of compulsion and infringed directly on
conscience rights. Basing the idea of disestablishment and non-support for religion
on protecting conscience made sense at that time. Part I argues, however, that while
members of the founding generation conceived of conscience rights mostly in
religious terms, they understood the notion of freedom of conscience more broadly.
Part II then examines the modern development of a taxpayer conscience rationale
for no-aid of religion and the arguments in favor and against that theory. As stated
in the previous paragraph, this Article concludes that the arguments against recognizing a taxpayer conscience rationale are more compelling than those in its favor.
That discussion then necessarily leads to an examination in Part III of taxpayer
standing for Establishment Clause challenges, which concludes that it too lacks a
defensible basis.47
Part IV then offers an alternative theory for prohibiting the application of public
monies for inherently religious activities: a modified version of Madison’s “no agency”
principle. As scholars have recognized, Madison’s no-agency theory is a jurisdictional principle, one that deprives the government of authority to act on religious
matters.48 Some scholars have asserted that the no-agency theory directs that the
45

See generally Leo Pfeffer, Public Funds for Parochial Schools? No., 37 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 309 (1962).
46
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870–72 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying
alternative rationales for the no-aid principle).
47
No doubt, the discussion in Part III will distress my fellow separationists, particularly
those colleagues I worked with for a decade as legal director of Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, where we regularly advanced the taxpayer conscience rationale. My purpose in this Article is to enhance the integrity of the no-aid principle, not to undermine it.
48
See generally Jeffrey Sikkenga, Government Has No “Religious Agency”: James
Madison’s Fundamental Principle of Religious Liberty, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 745 (2012).
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government can take no position on religious matters, either pro or con, resulting in
a form of governmental ambivalence toward religion or a position of strict neutrality
toward religion.49 A narrower conception of no-agency, advocated here, instructs
that government cannot act with a religious purpose, either to advance or inhibit
religion, but can otherwise act on religion (i.e., regulate) in ways similar to its authority to act on related secular entities.50 While this conception may suggest allowing
neutral, non-ideological aid to flow equally to religious and secular entities, it does
not do so unqualifiedly. Here, no-agency includes an awareness of how public funds
are being used (an awareness of the natural and probable consequences of their
likely applications), and it deprives the government of authority to fund inherently
religious activities.51 This bar on funding is similar in some ways to the notion of
non-divertibility debated in Mitchell v. Helms.52 This conception of no-agency thus
may allow for the scrap tire program in Trinity Lutheran but not for the vouchers in
Zelman. As for standing to challenge unconstitutional expenditures and applications,
injury would not rest with taxpayers but with similarly situated secular (and possibly
religious) entities that have received (or are eligible for) the financial benefit, but are
not using the funds for inherently religious activity. They would have a particularized injury to challenge a religious entity’s use of public funds for religious purposes
under a no-agency theory. Part IV then concludes with several examples of how the
no-agency rule works in practice.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE CONSCIENCE-BASED RATIONALE
The story of the nation’s religious disestablishment has been recounted in numerous studies.53 While disagreement exists among scholarly and popular authors as to
49

See generally Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961) (advancing an early formal understanding of a no-agency approach).
50
See IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
5 (2014).
51
Admittedly, the category of “inherently religious activity” may be amorphous. As used
herein, it is intended to mean activity of a devotional or spiritual nature or activity that advances
the religious mission of the entity in gaining converts or increasing religious fealty. It does not
include non-devotional activities of a religiously affiliated entity or even houses of worship
that can be engaged in by a secular counterpart, e.g., a food bank or homeless shelter. It also does
not include financial aid that has both a secular purpose and application, such as Title I services
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. See Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
52
See Justice Thomas’s discussion of the divertibility issue in Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 820–25, 832–34 (2000).
53
See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOM: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–89 (1986); Michael W. McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44
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whether members of the founding generation intended to create a secular or pluralistic
republic (or even a Christian nation), and whether they intended the non-establishment
principle to prohibit government preference for one religion only or support for all
religions generally, there are some indisputable points of agreement. First, the
disestablishment impulse arose quickly as soon as the colonists severed their official
ties with Great Britain. Considering the long tradition of church establishments in
Western culture, the rapidity of change in early America was truly remarkable. In
1776, nine of thirteen colonies maintained some form of a religious establishment,
meaning financial support for one or more sanctioned Protestant denominations and
that important civic rights and privileges turned on one’s affiliation with a recognized church (in the Anglican colonies, it also meant government control over the
operations of the established church).54 Within a short span of ten years, that ratio
had been reversed with ten or eleven of fourteen states (depending on how one
views the new state of Vermont) effectively disestablishing.55
Second, and closely related, the primary catalyst for disestablishment in the states
was to abolish the compelled financial support of religion. In the words of historian
Thomas Curry, by the 1780s, “[t]he belief that government assistance to religion,
especially in the form of taxes, violated religious liberty had a long history.”56 And
third, people tied the rationale for abolishing compelled support of religion to rights
of conscience.57
The idea of an inalienable right of conscience had existed for a while. For members
of the founding generation, the antecedents of a right of conscience arose out of two
transformative events: the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution that
informed the Enlightenment. With the former, leaders of the Reformation such as
Martin Luther and John Calvin asserted a distinctly religious understanding of conscience rights, arguing that because certain doctrines and teachings of the Catholic
Church were unscriptural, to enforce their compliance on people infringed upon their
conscience which was answerable to God alone.58 “[T]he consciences of believers,”
Calvin wrote, “should rise above and advance beyond the [Church’s] law, forgetting
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003); Carl Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The ChurchState Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385; FORREST CHURCH,
SO HELP ME GOD (2007); THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010); STEVEN K.GREEN,THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT:CHURCH
AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 15–77 (2010).
54
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 105–33.
55
See GREEN, supra note 53, at 31–51. The Vermont Constitution of 1786 deleted language
from its 1777 constitution that required people to financially support religious worship, but the
legislature failed to strike a 1783 assessment law which allowed those towns so inclined to
continue to impose religious taxes. Id. at 36–37. That assessment law was finally repealed in
1807. Id. at 37.
56
CURRY, supra note 53, at 217.
57
See KIDD, supra note 53, at 46–47.
58
See Feldman, supra note 41, at 357–62.
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all law-righteousness.”59 Arising out of that tradition, Puritans and other dissenters to
church establishments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries asserted a personal
right of “private judgment” about religious matters.60 One such dissenter—here, to
organized Puritanism—was Roger Williams, who famously addressed conscience
rights within church-state terms in his letter, The Bloody Tenent, of Persecution for
Cause of Conscience (1644): “God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state; which enforced uniformity (sooner or later) is
the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing consciences, persecution of Christ Jesus
in His servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls.”61
Roger Williams’ writings about freedom of conscience, while important, were
less influential during the colonial period.62 Of greater significance and influence
were those by William Penn who, before establishing the colony with his name,
faced persecution in England for his conversion to Quakerism in 1667.63 In 1670,
Penn wrote a pamphlet, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, where he laid out
the case for freedom of conscience. “By liberty of conscience, we understand not only
a mere liberty of the mind, in believing or disbelieving this or that principle or doctrine;
but ‘the exercise of ourselves in a visible way of worship . . . .’”64 Accordingly, he
declared, “no man is so accountable to his fellow creatures, as to be imposed upon,
restrained, or persecuted for any matter of conscience whatever.”65 In founding his
colony in 1682, Penn prohibited any religious establishment or a religious tax, and
he invited religious dissenters from Europe, not solely fellow Quakers, to settle,
guaranteeing to every resident “the free possession of his or her faith and exercise
of worship towards God, in a manner as every person shall in conscience believe is
most acceptable to God.”66 Penn’s lively experiment in promoting religious equality
and freedom of conscience would become the model for other colonies and eventually the new states.67
59

Id. at 359.
NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: DISSENTING
PROTESTANTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1–4 (2012).
61
Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, of Persecution for Cause of Conscience, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 48, 48 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
62
See Feldman, supra note 41, at 372 n.45, 375, 427.
63
See J. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA
10, 13 (1990) (discussing Penn’s contributions to the fight against persecution of Quakers);
William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE 42, 42 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009).
64
Penn, supra note 63, at 43.
65
Id. at 44.
66
ISAAC SHARPLESS, A QUAKER EXPERIMENT IN GOVERNMENT 122 (Philadelphia, Alfred
J. Ferris 1898); see also William Penn, Laws Agreed upon in England, &c., 1682, in THE
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 63, at 118, 118.
67
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 78–85 (discussing the breadth of freedoms afforded in
Pennsylvania under William Penn compared to the other colonies).
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Religious dissenters were not the only ones to promote a right of conscience.
Writing a half-century after Penn, Connecticut lawyer and Congregationalist minister
Elisha Williams defended “a Christian’s natural and unalienable right of private
judgment in matters of religion.”68 “Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates
of his own conscience in the affairs of religion,” Williams wrote, “[a]nd as every
Christian is so bound, so he has an unalienable right to judge of the sense and meaning
of it and to follow his judgment wherever it leads him.”69 By the Revolution, this
religiously based understanding of a right of conscience was well established.70
A related impulse for a right of conscience arose during the Scientific Revolution and then the Enlightenment as secular oriented theorists, such as Francis Bacon
and Isaac Newton, sought to base knowledge and the discovery of scientific laws of
nature on reason and empiricism, freely arrived at, rather than being subject to
conformity with Church doctrines.71 A free conscience was a prerequisite to discover
those laws and to allow human knowledge to flower, even if both led in secular
directions. These impulses complemented each other, as reason and religion were
generally not in conflict according to most Enlightenment writers.72
John Locke was one of the more influential political theorists on the founding
generation and one who wrote extensively about a right of conscience. Locke understood the notion of a conscience right chiefly in religious terms, and he advocated for it on three grounds.73 First, the ability to acquire knowledge, religious and
otherwise, necessitated that people be able to follow “their own reason, and . . . the
dictates of their own consciences,”74 as “such is the nature of the understanding, that
it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.”75 Accordingly,
“[e]very Man has Commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of Error; and,
by reasoning, to draw him into Truth.”76 Second, Locke asserted that “because the
68

Elisha Williams, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants, in POLITICAL
SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 1730–1805, at 51, 85 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
69
Id. at 61.
70
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 136–38.
71
See JAMES M. BYRNE, RELIGION AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT: FROM DESCARTES TO
KANT 10–11, 151–55 (1996).
72
See Jeffrey Barnouw, The Separation of Reason and Faith in Bacon and Hobbs, and
Leibniz’s Theodicy, 42 J. HIST. IDEAS 607, 607–28 (1981); BYRNE, supra note 71, at 10–11,
150–60. See generally ETHAN H. SHAGAN, THE BIRTH OF MODERN BELIEF: FAITH AND
JUDGMENT FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 207–49 (2018).
73
Accord Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?,
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 911, 917–26 (2005) (identifying three traditional rationales for protecting
conscience, which he terms the “separate spheres,” “futility,” and “higher duty” rationales).
74
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 123, 128 (J.W. Gough ed., 1968).
75
Id. at 127.
76
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 39 (Mark
Goldie ed., 2010).
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Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the Commonwealth,” the
“Care of Souls is not committed to the Civil Magistrate.”77 Thus to compel any belief
was unjust and outside the authority of civil authorities.78 And third, compulsion of
belief was ineffective: “true and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion
[sic] of the Mind; without which nothing can be acceptable to God,” because “[m]en
cannot be forced to be saved . . . they must be left to their own Consciences.”79
Locke’s writings about religious toleration and conscience, like his political
works, greatly influenced the thinking of later generations of Americans, religious
and political figures alike.80 In the letter quoted above, Elisha Williams cited to
Locke for ideas about both civil government and religious understanding. “A man
may alienate some branches of his property and give up his right in them to others;
but he cannot transfer the rights of conscience, unless he could destroy his rational
and moral powers . . . .”81 And Williams tied the threat to conscience rights directly
to religious establishments:
[T]o carry the notion of a religious establishment so far as to
make it a rule binding to the subjects, or on any penalties whatsoever, seems to me to be oppressive of Christianity, to break in
upon the sacred rights of conscience, and the common rights and
privileges of all good subjects.82
Writing around the same time, Whig essayist Thomas Gordon, of Cato and the
Independent Whig, wrote in the latter that:
Religion is a voluntary Thing; it can no more be forced than
Reason, or Memory, or any Faculty of the Soul. To be devout
against our Will is an Absurdity . . . . We have no Power over
the Appetites of others, no more than over their Consciences.
Neither a Man’s Mind nor his Palate, can be subject to the Jurisdiction of another.83
77

Id. at 39, 45.
Id.
79
Id. at 39, 49.
80
See generally Sanford Kessler, John Locke’s Legacy of Religious Freedom, 17 POLITY
484 (1985); J. Judd Owen, Locke’s Case for Religious Toleration: Its Neglected Foundation
in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 69 J. POL. 156 (2007).
81
Williams, supra note 68, at 62.
82
Id. at 73.
83
CAROLINE ROBBINS,THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN 119–20 (1968)
(quoting Thomas Gordon & John Trenchard, Number XXXIV, in THE INDEPENDENT WHIG:
OR, A DEFENCE OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY, AND OF OUR ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENT,
AGAINST THE EXORBITANT CLAIMS AND ENCROACHMENTS OF FANATICAL AND DISAFFECTED
CLERGYMEN 211, 215 (London, J. Peele, 7th ed. 1736)).
78
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Finally, a generation later, Baptist leader Isaac Backus blended Lockean notions
about conscience and church-state relations with his dissenting evangelical perspective. The Massachusetts establishment, supported by its assessment system, was “very
hurtful to civil society” because it presumed that civil officials had authority over religious affairs.84 In addition, establishments violated “the law of Christ” that required
every person “to judge for himself, concerning the circumstantials as well as the
essentials, of religion, and to act according to the full persuasion of his own mind.”85
According to Thomas Curry, “When colonial commentators upheld freedom of
religion as a natural right and wrote in favor of ‘absolute liberty of conscience, and
entire freedom in all religious matters,’ they represented broad-based agreement.”86
For Backus and other dissenters living under eighteenth-century religious establishments, matters of conscience were not an abstract idea but an ever-present
concern. Even though the Massachusetts and Connecticut assemblies had granted
Baptists exemptions from paying assessments to support the dominant Congregational churches in 1729,87 exemption certificates were difficult to come by because
they required demonstrating membership in a recognized or incorporated church that
was served by a full-time minister (a problem for many Baptist churches served by
an itinerate pastor on a part-time basis).88 Local officials regularly denied certificates
(or ignored validated certificates); other times, pious Baptists refused to apply for
certificates on theological grounds, which resulted in tax collectors or tithingmen
seizing tangible property and cattle, foreclosing on farms, and sending dissenters to
jail.89 By the early 1770s, with Massachusetts’s assessment exemption expired and
the colony embroiled in the growing political crisis with Great Britain, Backus penned
his Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty (1773) where he tied tax assessments
directly to violations of conscience rights, with him now calling for full disestablishment rather than an equitable system of exemptions. Even a multiple establishment
that fairly distributed the taxes to all denominations “emboldens people to judge the
liberty of other men[’]s consciences.”90 Five years later, in a pamphlet opposing
84

Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty, in POLITICAL SERMONS
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 1730–1805, supra note 68, at 227, 358. “God has appointed
two kinds of government in the world, which are distinct in their nature, and ought never be
confounded together; one of which is called civil, the other ecclesiastical government.” Id.
at 334–35.
85
Id. at 358–59.
86
CURRY, supra note 53, at 78 (quoting Stephen Hopkins, An Account of the Planting and
Growth of Providence, in 19 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY
184 (1832)).
87
WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS’ STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND,
1630–1833, at 157–60 (1991).
88
See id. at 159–60.
89
Id. at 157–61.
90
Backus, supra note 84, at 357 (emphasis omitted). In his Appeal, Backus provided several
examples of Baptists having their farms confiscated and other property seized, as well as being
sent to jail, for failure to pay their religious taxes. Id. at 348–55.
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incorporating a religious assessment in the proposed Massachusetts Constitution,
Backus asserted: “How can liberty of conscience be rightly enjoyed, till this iniquity
is removed? The word of truth says, why is my liberty judged of another man’s
conscience? Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.”91
Predictably, members of New England’s Standing Order disputed that a forced
assessment supporting “public worship” violated rights of conscience; as one apologist
put it:
If the greatest part of the people, coincide with the public
authority of the State in giving the preference to any one religious
system and creed, the dissenting few, though they cannot conscientiously conform to the prevailing religion, yet ought to acquiesce
and rest satisfied that their religious Liberty is not diminished.92
Deaf to the dissenters’ conscience claims, the drafters of the Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and (initially) Vermont constitutions included provisions for maintaining forced assessments for the support of religion (Connecticut continued with its
assessment system under the auspices of its colonial charter).93
91

ISAAC BACKUS, GOVERNMENT AND LIBERTY DESCRIBED; AND ECCLESIASTICAL TY11 (Boston, Powards & Willis 1778) (emphasis omitted).
92
Worcestriensis, Number IV, in AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING
ERA, 1760–1805, at 449, 452–53 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
93
See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III (“As the happiness of a people, and the good order and
preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality; and
as these cannot be generally diffused through a community, but by the institution of the public
worship of God, and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality: Therefore, to promote their happiness and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the
people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with power to authorize
and require, and the legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns,
parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision,
at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God and for the support and
maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases where
such provision shall not be made voluntarily.”); N.H.CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. VI (“As morality
and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, will give the best and greatest security
to government, and will lay in the hearts of men, the strongest obligations to due subjection;
and as the knowledge of these, is most likely to be propagated through a society by the institution of the public worship of the DEITY, and of public instruction in morality and religion;
therefore, to promote those important purposes, the people of this State have a right to impower, and do hereby fully impower the legislature to authorize from time to time, the several
towns, parishes, bodies-corporate, or religious societies within this State, to make adequate
provision at their own expence, for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers
of piety, religion and morality . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. III (“That all men have
a natural and unalienable Right to worship Almighty God, according to the Dictates of their
own Consciences and Understanding, regulated by the word of God; and that no man ought,
or of right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship, or erect, or support any place
RANNY EXPOSED
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Among the remaining states, however, a consensus arose that any system of forced
assessments violated rights of conscience. Two states that had operated putative
establishments—North Carolina and New York—quickly abolished their assessment
systems in their new constitutions, joining the ranks of Delaware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island in affirming the voluntary support of religion.94 An
early example of this reactive impulse to religious assessments is found in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which declared that:
[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
and understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support
any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against, his own free will and consent . . . .95
Pennsylvania’s “no compelled support” of religion clause, which the Commonwealth added as a guarantee even though it had never operated an assessment system,
became the model for several other states.96 What is notable is that conscience was
of Worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the Dictates of his Conscience; nor can any
man who professes the protestant religion, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right,
as a Citizen, on account of his religious sentiment, or peculiar mode of religious Worship,
and that no Authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatsoever, that
shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the Rights of Conscience, in the free
exercise of religious worship: nevertheless, every Sect or Denomination of People ought to
observe the Sabbath, or Lord’s day, and keep up and support some sort of religious Worship,
which to them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed Will of God.”).
94
See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV (“[N]either shall any person, on any presence
whatsoever, be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his own faith or judgment,
nor be obliged to pay, for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship,
or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes right, of has
voluntarily and personally engaged to perform; but all persons shall be at liberty to exercise
their own mode of worship . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII (“[T]o guard against
that spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and
wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind, this convention doth further, in the name
and by the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind . . . .”).
95
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW
OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3082 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909).
96
See Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty; The Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America; General Synod of the United Church of Christ; Reverend Dr. J. Herbert
Nelson, II, as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as
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the primary solvent for securing the twin rights of freedom to worship without
molestation and to be free of compelled support for another person’s religion.
No place outside of New England had more rigorously enforced religious assessments than Virginia. By the 1760s, Virginia’s Anglican establishment—which had
earlier struggled from a lack of clergy—was firmly entrenched and closely aligned
with the colony’s powerful elite.97 Under its system, all residents were required to
pay assessments to support their local parish church and attend services, required
attendance being a convenient method of enforcing support.98 Despite the 1689
English Act of Toleration, civil and religious authorities grudgingly tolerated dissenting churches and clergy, requiring clergy to obtain licenses from less-thancooperative parish officials.99 The evangelical revivals of the First Great Awakening
(early 1740s) had facilitated an influx of New Side Presbyterian clergy into the
Piedmont region which had been settled by Scotch-Irish, to be followed in the 1760s
by Separate Baptists.100 Clergy and communicants of both groups resented and
resisted the various measures, including paying the assessments.101 As both evangelical bodies gained converts in the 1760s and 1770s, public officials clamped down
on dissenters and their clergy, particularly on Baptist ministers who refused to
obtain licenses based on theological principles.102 Dissenters were jailed, whipped,
and had property seized.103 It was in this climate in early 1774 that a young James
Madison, recently returned to Virginia from college in Princeton, New Jersey, discovered that a handful of Baptist ministers had been arrested and were being held in
a nearby jail.104 In a letter to a college friend, Madison bemoaned the ongoing religious
persecution that was taking place in Virginia, writing:
There are at this [time?] in the adjacent County not less than 5
or 6 well meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox. . . . So I
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S.
Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 18-1195). Those states being Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Vermont, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan.
97
CURRY, supra note 53, at 99–100.
98
Id. at 135–38.
99
RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740–1790, at 149, 152–53 (1982).
100
Id. at 148–51, 162, 164.
101
THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776–1787,
at 38–39, 75 (1977).
102
See id. at 38–39, 75; CURRY, supra note 53, at 100.
103
See, e.g., BUCKLEY, supra note 101, at 14; ISAAC, supra note 99, at 148–51, 167–77;
ROBERT B. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE BAPTISTS IN VIRGINIA
15 (Richmond, Robert B. Semple 1810); JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY: HOW
VIRGINIA’S RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS HELPED WIN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND SECURED
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 28–29, 32 (2010).
104
RAGOSTA, supra note 103, at 43–44.
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[leave you] to pity me and pray for Liberty of Conscience [to
revive among us.]105
The Revolutionary War disrupted Virginia’s Anglican establishment along with
its assessment system, and the legislature formally abolished the taxes in 1779.106
During this period, Thomas Jefferson penned his Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom designed to outlaw the resumption of the assessment. Jefferson justified
its permanent abolition on freedom of conscience grounds: “[T]o compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves
and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.”107 After the Treaty of Paris officially ended the
war in 1783, supporters of the newly reorganized Episcopal Church petitioned for
a new law authorizing a religious assessment.108 To make it more palatable, assessment leader Patrick Henry’s bill for “Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the
Christian Religion” included a provision to allow taxpayers to designate the Christian denomination to receive their tax or to allocate non-designated funds to “seminaries of learning.”109 With Jefferson now in France as the United States minister,
opposition leadership fell on James Madison. After a preliminary version of Henry’s
bill passed the House by a vote of 47–32, Madison secured the bill’s postponement
so he and other assessment opponents could mount a petition drive.110 Madison then
penned his famous Memorial and Remonstrance to rally support for the petitions,
which laid out fifteen arguments against all forms of religious establishments.111
Some of the arguments in the Memorial were jurisdictional—that civil government
had no authority over religious matters—while others were more pragmatic—that
religious establishments had not benefitted religion but had had an opposite effect.112
Running throughout many of his arguments, and providing a unifying theme, was
105

Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, 16 MARCH 1751–16 DECEMBER 1779, at 106, 106 (William T. Hutchinson
& William M.E. Rachal eds., 1962) (alterations in original).
106
CURRY, supra note 53, at 135–36.
107
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 77.
108
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 139–41.
109
See PATRICK HENRY, A BILL ESTABLISHING A PROVISION FOR TEACHERS OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1–2 (1784), https://www.colorado.edu/herbst/sites/default/files/attached
-files/nov_16_-_religion.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L96-WN3A].
110
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 134–43; BUCKLEY, supra note 101, at 113–17, 128–31;
Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as a First Amendment Matrix: Henry, Madison, and
Assessment Establishment, 8 J. CHURCH & STATE 344, 354 (1966).
111
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 143–44; BUCKLEY, supra note 101, at 131–36. See
generally JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/Madison%27sMemo
rial.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP6R-JSCP].
112
See MADISON, supra note 111, at 1–2.
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that forced support of religion violated rights of conscience. “The Religion . . . of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right.”113 Paraphrasing Locke, Madison declared that all people entering
society were “to be considered as retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.’”114 And when it came to tax
assessments for the support of religion, Madison wrote, “Who does not see . . . [t]hat
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”115
Madison’s Memorial was not the only memorial submitted against the assessment bill, but it helped turn public opinion against it, and the legislature permanently
tabled Henry’s bill.116 Madison then took advantage of the bill’s demise to introduce
Jefferson’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, which passed overwhelmingly.117
While, as historian John Ragosta has noted, there were multiple explanations for the
defeat of the assessment bill and the enactment of Jefferson’s bill in its stead—not
the least of which being evangelicals’ distrust and resentment toward the Anglican
clergy and the privileges the church had enjoyed—Jefferson’s and Madison’s arguments on behalf of conscience rights provided the disestablishment struggle with
a moral authority.118 As Madison later described matters: “This act is a true standard
of Religious liberty: its principle the great barrier against usurpations on the rights
of conscience.”119
Accordingly, the revolutionary argument that religious assessments violated the
rights of conscience of taxpayers had significant salience at that moment. The
assessments, which were imposed directly on behalf of religion, forced taxpayers
to support the official or recognized religious bodies.120 Those who were conscientiously opposed to the theology, doctrines, and practices of those bodies were
compelled to support institutions and beliefs that were contrary to their own “private
judgements.”121 In addition, those who refused to pay the religious tax were subjected to punishments and persecution: fines, whippings, and imprisonment.122 The
113
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America, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 1392, 1396 (1968); RAGOSTA, supra note 118, at 52–53.
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members of the founding generation rightfully “worried that conscience would be
violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with
whose beliefs they disagreed.”123 Members of the Court in Flast v. Cohen and its
progeny were thus correct to identify a historical nexus between taxation, compulsion, conscience, and government aid to religion. As the Flast Court identified,
“[O]ne of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause
and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used
to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”124 During the
founding period, that nexus was real and undeniable.
II. THE MODERN ADOPTION OF THE CONSCIENCE-BASED RATIONALE
If a legal challenge to religious assessments had arisen in the early 1800s, it
would have been understandable if the U.S. Supreme Court had developed a rule
prohibiting public aid to religion based on the nexus between taxation, compulsion,
conscience, and government support for religion. However, the Court was deprived
of that opportunity due to the accepted understanding that the Bill of Rights applied
only to actions of the federal government.125 In the two federal aid-to-religion cases
considered before incorporation in 1947, the Justices sidestepped the issue of a
connection between aid and compulsion by deciding in Bradfield v. Roberts (1899)
that the aid recipient—a Catholic hospital—operated as a secular entity,126 and in the
second case, Quick Bear v. Leupp (1908), that the funding to maintain a Catholic
religious mission came out of Indian trust funds and was not truly public money.127
Neither case therefore implicated the coercive aspect of taxes supporting religious
activities. As a result, the 160-year hiatus from disestablishment to incorporation
meant that an alternative constitutional rationale for the no-aid principle was not
allowed to evolve at the federal level. With no intervening development in Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding funding, it was as if in Everson that Justices
Black and Rutledge opened a time capsule, extracting a rationale from the past that
had little application to the financial realities of the mid-twentieth century.
123

Feldman, supra note 41, at 351.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563
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125
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And that is more or less what they did. In his majority opinion Black described the
historical antecedents to disestablishment where the majority of colonies had “erect[ed]
religious establishments [under] which all, whether believers or non-believers, would
be required to support and attend . . . all of these dissenters were compelled to pay
tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches.”128 Although Black
suggested other rationales for the no-aid rule—to protect religious institutions from
“‘invasions of the civil authority’”129—compelled support via taxation was the controlling rationale.130 A compulsion of conscience rationale also runs throughout Justice
Rutledge’s dissenting opinion, with it beginning by quoting applicable passages from
Jefferson’s Statute.131 None of the opinions challenged the revolutionary understanding that tax support for religion violated taxpayers’ rights of conscience or questioned why that assumption should apply under modern taxing structures. Similarly,
the scholarly criticism of the Everson opinions focused on the Court’s historicism
and adoption of separationism as the legal paradigm, not on its assumption that using
taxpayer funds for religious purposes violated rights of conscience.132
This rationale for the no-aid principle persisted for forty-plus years and formed
the basis of the Court’s holding in Flast v. Cohen. Although Chief Justice Warren’s
opinion largely assumed that using tax funds to aid religion violated rights of conscience,133 Justice Stewart’s concurrence made that assumption explicit: “Today’s
128

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1947).
Id. at 15.
130
Id. at 16 (The state “cannot consistently with the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of
the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which
teaches the tenets and faith of any church.”).
131
Id. at 28, 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Denial or abridgment of religious freedom was
a violation of rights both of conscience and of natural equality. State aid was no less obnoxious
or destructive to freedom and to religion itself than other forms of state interference.”). In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson placed greater emphasis on preventing what he viewed as
a sect preference in the funding and then on ensuring the independence of civil and religious
entities and preventing “bitter religious controversy” over funding. Id. at 21, 26–27 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). Still, he accepted the assumption of taxpayer conscience: “One of our basic
rights is to be free of taxation to support a transgression of the constitutional command that
the authorities ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.’” Id. at 22.
132
See PARSONS, supra note 6, at 140–48, 177–78; O’NEILL, supra note 6, at 189–218.
See generally Murray, supra note 6.
133
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (“Our history vividly illustrates that one of the
specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption
was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or
to support religion in general. James Madison, who is generally recognized as the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, observed in his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that ‘the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.’”).
129
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decision no more than recognizes that the appellants have a clear stake as taxpayers
in assuring that they not be compelled to contribute even ‘three pence . . . of (their)
property for the support of any one establishment.’”134 Justice Harlan challenged the
assumption of a taxpayer burden, but he did not discuss the nexus between tax support and compulsion/conscience. Rather, he questioned the nexus between the
taxpayers and a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs’ complaint, Harlan wrote,
contains no allegation that the contested expenditures will in any
fashion affect the amount of these taxpayers’ own existing or
foreseeable tax obligations. Even in cases in which such an allegation is made, the suit cannot result in an adjudication either
of the plaintiff’s tax liabilities or of the propriety of any particular
level of taxation. The relief available to such a plaintiff consists entirely of the vindication of rights held in common by all citizens.135
Justice Harlan’s assessment of a taxpayer’s injury thus focused on the concept of a generalized grievance rather than on the question of compulsion and conscience rights.
So that rationale remained largely intact. That assumption also survived the
decision in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United136 fourteen years
later. In denying standing to a challenge to a transfer of government surplus property
to a sectarian college, Justice Rehnquist distinguished the challenged financial
benefit (i.e., grant) from a tax expenditure, thereby narrowing the scope of the Flast
doctrine but otherwise not questioning its core assumption.137 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s cramped view of standing that would deprive
courts the ability of adjudicating otherwise cognizable Establishment Clause claims.
But he also reaffirmed the conventional, historically based rationale that tax expenditures for religion violated rights of conscience.138 After citing to the same historical statements related in the Everson opinions, Brennan declared that it was “clear,
in the light of this history, that one of the primary purposes of the Establishment
Clause was to prevent the use of tax moneys for religious purposes. The taxpayer
was the direct and intended beneficiary of the prohibition on financial aid to religion.”139 Thus the holding in Valley Forge did little to undermine the taxpayercompulsion rationale, and subsequent commentary generally reaffirmed the bona
fides of that rationale.140
134

Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
137
See id. at 479–81.
138
See id. at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139
Id. Later in his opinion, Brennan reaffirmed that a taxpayer must be entitled to sue “in
order to halt the continuing and intolerable burden on his pocketbook, his conscience, and
his constitutional rights.” Id. at 510.
140
Bill Latham, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
135
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As noted in the introduction, the taxpayer-compulsion rationale still commands
a large following and is generally accepted on face value.141 More recently, however,
scholars have called into question certain aspects of that rationale. The first, and most
obvious, criticism concerns the justification for recognizing a conscience objection
based on religious grounds but not one based on other grounds. It points to the
incongruity of recognizing the conscience claim of an atheist opposed to the funding
of religious education (i.e., a religious activity), but not of a born-again Christian
who objects to his tax dollars paying for the teaching of evolution in the public
schools (i.e., not a religious activity).142 Both people may be consciously opposed
to being forced via taxation to support activity with which they disagree, but only
the former action arguably violates the Establishment Clause and is recognized as
raising a cognizable claim for preventing the government expenditure. According
to Professor Micah Schwartzman,
[I]t is unclear why taxpayers’ freedom of conscience is violated
only when government provides financial support for religion.
Taxpayers are required to pay for all sorts of government programs they find morally objectionable. Except when it comes to
funding religion, however, they have no constitutional recourse
to oppose such programs.143
The common response to this privileging of conscience-based objections to
government funding of religion relies on two claims: the historical connection between rights of conscience and religion; and the distinctiveness of religious-based
Church and State: Taxpayer Standing and the Establishment Clause, 34 BAYLOR L. REV.
748, 761 (1982) (“[I]n light of the history of the establishment clause, it is clear that every
man must be allowed to worship or not in accordance with his own conscience. No majority
can ever compel a minority faith or a single individual to contribute even ‘three pence of their
property for the support of any one establishment.’” (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 114 (Stewart,
J., concurring))); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—
An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5, 13–14 (1987) (“[M]eaningful danger to religious liberty is
posed when compulsorily raised tax funds are expended for religious purposes. It violates
my religious liberty to have my tax raised funds spent for even my own religion, and it compounds the violation if they are spent to support some religion with which I am not affiliated
or with those precepts I disagree.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem:
Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1008 (1991) (“Taxation is coercion,
and to require taxpayers to support religions they do not accept is understood to violate their
religious conscience.”).
141
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2281–83 (2020) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
142
See Steven Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 CONST.COMMENT. 365,
365–67 (2007) (describing such a scenario involving the fictional “Al Agnostic and Betty
Basic”); see also Schwartzman, supra note 41, at 327–30.
143
Schwartzman, supra note 41, at 322.
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conscience—i.e., the unique harm associated with having to compromise one’s
religiously grounded beliefs as opposed to politically grounded beliefs, for example.
Professor Noah Feldman has offered a strong defense of the former claim:
To the eighteenth-century mind, liberty of conscience meant that
the individual must not be coerced into performing religious
actions or subscribing to religious beliefs that he believed were
sinful in the eyes of God and that could therefore endanger his
salvation. Indeed, it was, following Locke, literally “absurd, to
speak of allowing Atheists Liberty of Conscience,” because
conscience necessarily related to one’s salvation, in which atheists presumably disbelieved altogether.
....
. . . [If we] broaden conscience to include secular matters of
deep belief . . . the Lockean distinction between the sphere of the
church and that of the state evaporates. Suddenly there is no
clear rationale for allowing government to take any action of any
kind where it violates conscience; or alternatively, all attempts
to protect conscience look unjustifiable.144
The Constitution, Professor Feldman urges, “protects liberty of conscience, it would
appear, only in the sphere of government action that relates specifically to religion.”145
While Professor Feldman is correct that historical affirmations of conscience
claims appeared most commonly with respect to religious opinions—for Locke,
solely within that sphere—it is not clear that members of the founding generation
subscribed to such a narrow view. In the crisis years preceding the American Revolution, pamphlet writers occasionally asserted that the coercive acts of Parliament
violated rights of political conscience.146 Jefferson, also, did not always describe conscience claims exclusively in religious terms. Although his statement that “to compel
a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical” was made within the context of his
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,147 Jefferson’s notion of conscience seems
144

Feldman, supra note 41, at 424–26.
Id. at 424.
146
See, e.g., BRITANNUS AMERICANICUS, A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO INHABITANTS OF NEWYORK 1 (1765); A BRITISH BOSTONIAN, AN ORATION ON THE BEAUTIES OF LIBERTY OR THE
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICANS 24–26 (Hartford, Ebenezer Watson 1772); RICHARD
PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT,
AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA 7–11 (London, T. Cadell 1776).
147
Jefferson, supra note 107, at 77; accord Smith, supra note 73, at 914 n.13 (“Notice that
145
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broader. Indeed, in his Bill for the Diffusion of General Knowledge for establishing
public schools, written during the same time, he urged “illuminat[ing], as far as
practicable, the minds of the people at large, . . . giv[ing] them knowledge of those
facts” to guard against efforts to keep them in ignorance.148 This conformed with his
earlier statement in his Notes on the State of Virginia that “[r]eason and free inquiry
are the only effectual agents against error.”149 For Jefferson, the value of unconstrained
opinions (i.e., conscience) transcended merely religious ones. As Jefferson famously
declared in an 1800 letter to Benjamin Rush, he had “sworn upon the altar of God,
eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man,” not solely
clerical tyranny.150 In later letters related to establishing the University of Virginia,
Jefferson praised in general terms “the illimitable freedom of the human mind” and the
freedom “to follow truth wherever it may lead.”151 Jefferson’s understanding of
conscience claims seems broadly based.
The additional response to the historical argument asks why a religious view of
conscience rights should control today when many people adhere to secularly based
convictions as strongly as other people hold religiously based ones. The strength of
this response may turn on how one defines “conscience,”152 but modern society has
collectively recognized conscience claims regarding a variety of subjects that do not
involve religious convictions, political and environmental ones to name two. In today’s
society, every taxpayer furnishes money for the “propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves”153—military armaments and family planning services, for example—so
that taxpayers regularly fund numerous government policies to which they have
serious conscience-based objections. The Court has affirmed this in its holdings

the evil to be avoided is forced support of ‘opinions [one] disbelieves’—not only of religious
opinions one disbelieves.”); Schwartzman, supra note 41, at 322–23.
148
Thomas Jefferson, 79. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18 June
1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132
-0004-0079 [https://perma.cc/FX2J-DYFF] (last visited May 6, 2021).
149
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., Univ.
of North Carolina Press 1982). Although the passage was written within a discussion about
religious constraints on freedom of conscience, the sentiment is not limited to religious freedom
of conscience.
150
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-32-02-0102 [https://perma.cc/EY9H
-947C] (emphasis added) (last visited May 6, 2021).
151
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820), FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-1712 [https://perma.cc/X7KL
-Q8VK] (last visited May 6, 2021).
152
Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
325, 328 (2005) (“[W]hen we describe an act as being done from ‘conscience’ we usually mean
at least to say that the person in question acted on the basis of a sincere conviction about what
is morally required or forbidden.”).
153
Jefferson, supra note 107, at 77.
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concerning the forced payment of union dues, among others.154 In today’s world, “the
idea that there is something distinctive about religious conscience, or that claims of
conscience can only be religious in nature, has become normatively untenable.”155
The second criticism of a taxpayer conscience claim flows immediately from the
first. Scholars have long recognized the problem with recognizing any conscience
objection to excuse a taxpayer from supporting legitimate government policies and
programs to which that taxpayer objects.156 The harm a taxpayer suffers from an
appropriation from general tax revenues is abstract and tenuous. As the Court has
affirmed on numerous occasions, “the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the
federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a
basis for” a legally cognizable injury.157 And as the Court observed a century ago,
and has continued to reaffirm,
interest in the moneys of the treasury . . . is shared with millions
of others, is comparatively minute and indeterminable, and the
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so
remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an
appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.158
This is where the taxpayer-compulsion rationale has always been on its weakest
historical footing. The practice that members of the revolutionary generation
154

See Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018)
(“When speech is compelled . . . individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing
free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning,
and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding ‘involuntary affirmation’ of objected-to beliefs would require ‘even more immediate and urgent
grounds’ than a law demanding silence.”).
155
Schwartzman, supra note 41, at 324; accord Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending,
and Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience,
54 VILL. L. REV. 655, 659 (2009) (“[T]here are solid reasons for believing that respect for
conscience should not be ‘limited to religiously shaped or informed consciences’ or confined
to specifically religious questions and contexts.”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause
as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 35 n.137 (1998) (“As citizens, we are taxed to support all manner of policies and programs with which we disagree.
Tax dollars pay for weapons of mass destruction that some believe are evil. Taxes pay for abortions and the execution of capital offenders, which some believe are acts of murder by the
state. Taxes pay the salaries of public officials whose policies we despise and oppose at every
opportunity. None of these complaints give rise to judicially cognizable ‘harms’ to federal taxpayers. And there is no reason that a taxpayer’s claim of ‘religious coercion’ is any different.”).
156
McConnell, supra note 140, at 1010 (“[T]he government necessarily makes many expenditures despite the conscientious objections of large numbers of taxpayers—expenditures on
armaments, for example. For the most part, there is no constitutional remedy for this.”).
157
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952).
158
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923); accord DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006).
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complained about, and the one that Jefferson and Madison so eloquently wrote
against, differs in crucial respects from a disbursement to religion out of general tax
funds today. Under colonial establishments, officials imposed free-standing assessments on residents to pay directly for the support of a recognized minister and for
“public religion.”159 They were not general taxing schemes that funded a variety of
services.160 To be sure, Patrick Henry’s sanitized Bill Establishing a Provision for
the Teachers of the Christian Religion allowed taxpayers to designate their assessment to their own religious society or, if not, to be placed in the general funds to
support “seminaries of learning,” but the indisputable and overarching purpose of
the tax—as the bill’s title indicated—was to support religion.161 Similarly, the
Massachusetts Constitution authorized towns to tax their residents “for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public
Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision
shall not be made voluntarily.”162 Under these provisions, an assessment represented
a specific tax extracted solely to support religion—in many instances, for beliefs to
which a taxpayer was consciously opposed—accompanied with the compulsive
threat of having one’s property or person seized for failure to pay the tax.
In contrast, the revenue that paid for the transportation reimbursements in Everson
came from general tax funds, not separately extracted for the specific purpose of
subsidizing religious activity.163 This has been the pattern in the majority of the public
aid to religion cases considered by the Supreme Court—that governments used funds
raised through general tax extractions (such as income taxes) that funded a variety
of services.164 For example, the monies for the educational equipment and materials
at issue in Mitchell v. Helms were distributed under the Education Consolidation and
Improvement Act, which channels congressional appropriations drawn from general
tax revenues toward educational programs in public and private schools.165 This
common pattern of raising revenue through a system of general taxation and then
distributing those funds to pay for myriad public programs and services, which are
frequently determined through later legislative appropriations, differs significantly
159

Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237,
1239–40 (1986).
160
See supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text; LEVY, supra note 53, at 1–24.
161
HENRY, supra note 109, at 2.
162
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III.
163
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 n.3, 6 (1947).
164
The public monies in question in Lemon v. Kurtzman apparently represented the exception
to the general practice. There, the legislature enacted the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act with the express goal of assisting financially troubled private
schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971). Revenue for the Act was derived from
a separate tax on horse racing entrance fees, and the plaintiff, Alton Lemon, alleged that, in
addition to being a taxpayer, he had purchased a ticket at a race track that was subject to the
specific tax. Id. at 610–11.
165
530 U.S. 793, 801–03 (2000).
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from the historical religious assessment system.166 To be sure, at some level, all
taxation involves a degree of compulsion and, as noted, taxpayers may have conscientious objections to various policies and programs funded by their (and others’)
taxes, but it raises the question of whether such actions burden a cognizable conscience
interest.167 In most if not all instances, the “offense” to one’s conscience from disbursements of general tax revenue is only tenuous and abstract, not something
experienced directly or even indirectly. Many times, taxpayers are unaware that some
infinitesimal portion of their taxes is funding a policy or program they find offensive.168 The taxpayer has at best suffered, in the words of Justice Scalia, a “psychic
injury.”169 This is vastly different from the conscience claim of an eighteenth-century
New England Baptist who had the stark choice of either financially supporting the local
Congregational Church and effectively assisting in the dissemination of its “abhorrent” doctrines—in essence, taxing Peter to pay for Paul’s religion—or living in
constant fear of the late-night knock at the door by the sheriff or tithingman.170
Quoting Jefferson, Professor Steven Smith distinguishes “compelling a taxpayer
to pay for ends of which he disapprove[s]” from “compelling him to support ‘opinions
which he disbelieves.’”171 Under this distinction—one that privileges the latter situation,
claims of conscience have special force in matters of expression
of opinion or belief. It is not necessarily tyrannical, or a violation of conscience, to make a taxpayer pay for programs (a war,
for example) to which he is conscientiously opposed. But it is
tyrannical to force the taxpayer to subsidize the promulgation of
opinions he disbelieves.172

166

In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007), the plurality
recognized this distinction between a disbursement made from general tax collections and
the collection of a specific tax assessment, noting how, as in Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944), “a taxpayer has standing to challenge the collection of a specific tax
assessment as unconstitutional; being forced to pay such a tax causes a real and immediate
economic injury to the individual taxpayer.” Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (2007) (plurality opinion).
167
Smith, supra note 142, at 366 (“After all, many citizens and taxpayers will say, sincerely, that they are opposed in conscience to any number of things that (with the support of
their tax dollars) government does. Some citizens are conscientiously opposed to particular
(or all) military activities, others to particular government funded programs in the arts or in
science, others to an array of ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ social programs.”).
168
Id. at 376 (“The taxpayer, by contrast, pays money into a general fund which is used
to support a whole variety of activities and programs—most of which the taxpayer knows
little or nothing about, and many of which are presumptively beneficial. So again, it is far from
clear that the taxpayer has any responsibility for the fact that some of the money is used for purposes to which she is conscientiously opposed.”).
169
Hein, 551 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
170
See generally MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 87.
171
Smith, supra note 142, at 376–77.
172
Id. at 377.
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Smith’s distinction has some appeal. In applying tax monies to pay for religious
education, the government is not asking any taxpayer to endorse the correctness of
government financial support for religion (i.e., an opinion) but merely to help pay
for a program that, in most if not all instances, promotes a secular policy goal (e.g.,
providing secular textbooks or educational materials). The taxpayer is not complicit
in furthering some arguably offensive program. In contrast, in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, the State attempted to compel the Barnette children
to publicly affirm an opinion about the patriotic values associated with the American
flag—something that was anathema to their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.173 As this
Article will address, “There are good reasons to be cautious about public support of
religious activities and institutions,” as Professor Richard Garnett has written.174 “The
best reason, however, is not because such support violates taxpayers’ ‘consciences’—
it does not.”175
III. THE ERROR OF TAXPAYER STANDING
Based on the foregoing discussion, the saliency of recognizing taxpayer standing
for raising an Establishment Clause challenge to disbursements from general tax
revenues has already been answered. The rule in Flast v. Cohen recognizing an exception from the general ban on taxpayer standing makes no sense if that exception
is based on the taxpayer conscience rationale.176
The purpose of this Part is not to defend the Court’s standing jurisprudence,
particularly not its trend in recent decades of narrowing of the availability of bringing
lawsuits.177 Despite the Justices’ assertion that standing rules are mandated by Article
III’s requirement of a case or controversy for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction,
standing is essentially a rule of the Court’s own creation, particularly with its definition of a cognizable injury.178 One could argue that because many alleged Establishment
Clause violations—such as the government’s use of religious symbols or, again,
disbursements from general tax revenues aiding religious activity—impose harms
that are shared equally by all citizens,179 the Court should abandon the requirement
173

319 U.S. 624, 625–29 (1943).
Garnett, supra note 155, at 672.
175
Id.
176
An exception to this statement would be a situation involving a special tax imposed on
a taxpayer, the proceeds of which would directly fund inherently religious activities. See
supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
177
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future
of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115 (discussing the potential for
narrowing of the standing doctrine under the Establishment Clause after Hein).
178
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992).
179
William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and
174
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of standing completely and recognize a type of constitutional “citizen suit.” The
concurrences in Flast suggested as much—that the harm perpetrated by some Establishment Clause violations are collectively felt such that any citizen should be able
to use the judiciary to correct that error.180 In essence, every American is harmed when
the government engages in activities that advance religion.181 Such an approach would
alleviate relying on the fiction of taxpayer compulsion under a disbursement from
the general tax fund.182 Persisting with the requirement that some citizens (i.e., taxpayers) are more injured than others, but then limiting that injury to actions arising
under Congress’s tax and spend authority, leads to absurd results as in Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Foundation, Inc., where alleged violations of the no-aid principle undertaken by the Executive were immunized.183 But, of course, the trend of the current
Supreme Court is in the direction of hardening standing requirements, not lessening
them,184 so the following discussion proceeds under the assumption that current
standing rules control.
As suggested in the previous Part, a conscience-based rationale for an exception
from the general prohibition on taxpayer standing makes no sense. The injury to
one’s conscience by the government disbursing of monies from general tax revenues

the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 231–32 (“[P]articularized and concrete Establishment Clause harms are often the exception, not the rule. The reason is straightforward.
The Establishment Clause is in large measure aimed at curbing injuries that are, by their very
nature, intangible and widely shared. That is, many of the purposes underlying the anti-establishment mandate are directed specifically at preventing precisely the broad, nonconcrete ‘psychic’
harms that Justice Scalia derided in his opinion in Hein as nonjusticiable.”).
180
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (embracing the concept of “private attorneys general” to correct constitutional wrongs); id. at 115 (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (speaking of the interests of “the taxpayer and all other citizens have in the churchstate issue”).
181
See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Flast . . . arose because state sponsorship of religion sometimes harms individuals
only (but this ‘only’ is no small matter) in their capacity as contributing members of our national
community.”); see also Note, Taxpayer Suits, 82 HARV. L. REV. 224, 227 (1968) (“A taxpayer seeking to enjoin governmental expenditures as unlawful clearly does not present a
legally protected interest for judicial protection, since he does not question the government’s
right to take his money and is not claiming that the statute allegedly violated was intended to
protect his economic interest qua taxpayer.”).
182
See Esbeck, supra note 155, at 40 (“[T]axpayer standing is a mere surrogate for vesting
in a non-Hohfeldian litigant the requisite access to the courthouse in order that the federal courts
may adjudicate a structural violation as set out in the Establishment Clause. Because the
claim is non-Hohfeldian, there is no one with individualized injury caused by the violation.”).
183
See generally Steven K. Green, The Slow, Tragic Demise of Standing in Establishment
Clause Challenges, 5 ADVANCE 117 (2011) (discussing the immunizing effect of Hein and
other Establishment Clause cases on the political branches).
184
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 177.
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is so tenuous, “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” as to be non-cognizable.185 By the
point of disbursement, the taxpayer has lost all connection to, and all claim on, the
taxes she paid on some earlier date. Perhaps it is worth reconsidering a passage from
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast:
Taxes are ordinarily levied by the United States without limitations
of purpose; absent such a limitation, payments received by the
Treasury in satisfaction of tax obligations lawfully created become
part of the Government’s general funds. . . . [At a minimum, the
Tax and Spend Clauses of Article I] surely mean[] that the United
States holds its general funds, not as stakeholder or trustee for
those who have paid its imposts, but as surrogate for the population
at large. Any rights of a taxpayer with respect to the purposes for
which those funds are expended are thus subsumed in, and extinguished by, the common rights of all citizens. To characterize
taxpayers’ interests in such expenditures as proprietary or even
personal either deprives those terms of all meaning or postulates
for taxpayers a scintilla juris in funds that no longer are theirs.186
If taxes are lawfully extracted from a taxpayer, the monies become the property
of the government. Not only have the taxpayer’s rights to those monies been
extinguished, the taxpayer retains no complicity in how her taxes, now comingled
with those of millions of other taxpayers, are used. For example, a Quaker is legally
obligated to submit her income taxes to pay for a variety of government programs.
That a portion of her taxes were theoretically used to purchase a rifle and a bullet
that in turn were used to kill an enemy combatant does not make the Quaker complicit
in that death. Similarly, it is difficult to see the conscience violation to the Quaker
(or a church-state separationist) when the ultimate application of the funds has
occurred as a result of numerous intervening actions that have led to the disbursement. If “independent private choice” breaks the “circuit” as to the unconstitutionality of tuition vouchers,187 then the government’s control over and disbursement of
tax funds for religious purposes is attributable to the government, not to the taxpayer
who originally supplied some of the tax revenue.
Unfortunately, the post-Flast cases involving taxpayer Establishment Clause
challenges are less than helpful on this matter. Valley Forge left in place the taxpayer conscience rationale, simply limiting its application to disbursements pursuant
to Article I tax and spend powers.188 Justice Rehnquist declined to respond to Justice
185

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 118–19 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
188
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1982).
186

2021]

NO AID, NO AGENCY

1083

Brennan’s assertion that the transfer of government property to a sectarian college
placed an “intolerable burden on his pocketbook, his conscience, and his constitutional rights.”189 In Hein, the plurality, speaking through Justice Alito, continued the
Valley Forge distinction by reiterating that taxpayer standing is limited to “a specific
congressional appropriation,” not a disbursement occurring pursuant to some other
authority (there, through an Executive Order).190 In Hein, the logic of the taxpayer
conscience rationale had been raised in the briefing,191 but resolving that question was
not necessary for the result, allowing Justice Kennedy to affirm that the “[Establishment] Clause expresses the Constitution’s special concern that freedom of conscience
not be compromised by government taxing and spending in support of religion. In
my view the result reached in Flast is correct and should not be called into question.”192 Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Souter reaffirmed the taxpayer conscience
rationale, writing that “[t]he right of conscience and the expenditure of an identifiable three pence raised by taxes for the support of a religious cause are therefore not
to be split off from one another.”193 Despite alleging the lack of “[c]oherence and
candor” in the Court’s taxpayer holdings and declaring that “Flast is damaged goods,”
Justice Scalia did not challenge Kennedy’s and Souter’s assumptions.194
Most recently in Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, the Court further
narrowed the availability of taxpayer standing—now, not applicable to state tax
credits—but again reaffirmed the basic premise of the taxpayer conscience rationale,
with Justice Kennedy noting that James Madison opposed the Virginia assessment
bill “on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious devotion in violation of
conscience. In Madison’s view, government should not ‘force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment.’”195 Like
Justice Kennedy, Justice Kagan defended the taxpayer conscience rationale in her
189

Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 604 (2007) (plurality
opinion).
191
See Brief for the American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 12–14, Hein, 551 U.S. 587 (No. 06-157), 2007 WL 43247, at *12–14.
192
Hein, 551 U.S. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193
Id. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting).
194
Id. at 625, 634 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
195
563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011). Justice Kennedy made the hyper-technical argument that because the tax credits were not drawn from the general revenue, they could not violate other
taxpayers’ conscience rights:
[W]hat matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs receive government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that moneys have been
extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious institution in violation
of the citizen’s conscience. Under that inquiry, respondents’ argument
fails. Like contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass
directly from taxpayers to private organizations.
Id. at 144.
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passionate dissent, quoting from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance. But
Justice Kagan then made a curious argument that seemed to undermine the efficacy
of taxpayer standing:
No taxpayer can point to an expenditure (by cash grant or otherwise) and say that her own tax dollars are in the mix; in fact,
they almost surely are not. “[I]t is,” as we have noted, “a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional . . . expenditure
causes an individual . . . taxpayer any measurable economic
harm.” That is as true in Establishment Clause cases as in any
others. Taxpayers have standing in these cases despite their
foreseeable failure to show that the alleged constitutional violation involves their own tax dollars, not because the State has
used their particular funds.196
She was, of course, correct. But if a taxpayer cannot show that her taxes contributed
to the government’s support of religion, then they were not extracted in a manner
that coerced her conscience, and the taxpayer conscience rationale for the no-aid
rule crumbles.197
Does this call for the outright rejection of Flast and taxpayer standing? So long
as taxpayer standing relies on a general taxpayer conscience rationale, it seems so.
This does not mean that no taxpayer could ever raise a conscience-based challenge
to a government disbursement in aid of religion. As discussed above, if that tax extraction is for the sole purpose of aiding religious activities (as occurred during the
revolutionary era), then a legitimate conscience claim exists. I agree with Professor
Schwartzman that
when compelled subsidies are raised using special taxes or targeted
assessments, taxpayers are more likely to perceive a closer association with the [activity] they find objectionable and, consequently, to “suffer a more acute limitation on their presumptive
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Id. at 165 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hein, 551 U.S. at 593 (plurality opinion)).
The point Justice Kagan sought to make was that a distinction between a disbursement
from tax revenues and a tax credit makes no economic sense as either can be used to fund
religious activity: “Appropriations and tax subsidies are readily interchangeable; what is a
cash grant today can be a tax break tomorrow.” Id. at 168. The Establishment Clause harm
is equivalent under either scenario. This observation supports the thesis of this Article: The
taxpayer conscience rationale for the no-aid rule is artificial. As she acknowledged, the Flast
rule “arose because ‘the taxing and spending power [may] be used to favor one religion over
another or to support religion in general[]’ . . . without causing particularized harm to
discrete persons.” Id. at 169.
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autonomy as speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for
others to say.”198
Such targeted assessments for religion, however, are rare.
Justice Scalia was correct that when the notion of compulsion related to a general
tax expenditure is reduced to a psychic injury, “[a]ny taxpayer would be able to sue
whenever tax funds were used in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.”199
The understanding of compulsion to support another’s religion becomes meaningless. It seems that the logical conclusion is that, in the words of Professor Richard
Garnett, “Flast was wrongly decided, and the no-establishment rule does not protect
the liberty of conscience primarily by authorizing taxpayer standing to challenge
disbursements of public funds.”200
IV. “NO AGENCY” OVER RELIGIOUS MATTERS
If the taxpayer conscience rationale provides an insufficient basis for the Establishment Clause’s no-aid principle, then what remains of the no-aid rule and who
would be able to enforce it? Do any other rationales exist to justify a bar to government funding of religious activity? Jurists and scholars have long proposed alternative theories to support the no-aid rule, some of which have gained traction but,
unfortunately, all of which have been overshadowed by the taxpayer conscience
rationale. This may be because some of the alternative rationales have appeared selfserving or less than sincere. A common argument is the “religious integrity” rationale: The reason for barring government assistance for religious activity is to protect
the integrity of religious institutions. The argument is that government financial
support of religion makes religious institutions dependent on government and in turn
compromises them as they adjust their religious ministries to be more amenable to
government policy.201 This strain is present in Madison’s writings. In his Memorial
and Remonstrance, Madison maintained that aid to religion creates “a dependence
on the powers of this world” and “weaken[s] in those who profess this Religion a
pious confidence in its innate excellence.”202 In a later passage, Madison related how
the government support of religious establishments, “instead of maintaining the purity
and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation . . . [encouraging] pride and
indolence in the Clergy.”203 Similarly, Jefferson argued that public aid for religion
“tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage,
198

Schwartzman, supra note 41, at 370 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544
U.S. 550, 575–76 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
199
Hein, 551 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200
Garnett, supra note 155, at 672.
201
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[G]overnment
aid corrupts religion.”); Marshall & Nichol, supra note 179, at 243–46.
202
MADISON, supra note 111, at 3–4.
203
Id. at 4.
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by bribing with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who will
externally profess and conform to it.”204 Although there is ample historical evidence
supporting this rationale, it also has a patronizing quality. Religious groups that have
sought forms of government assistance for their operations—Catholics in particular—
have long considered this argument dubious if not insincere when it is raised by
groups otherwise opposed to religious based schooling and social services.205 Not all
neutral aid programs—particularly those with discrete policy objectives—require
religious grant recipients to compromise their principles to receive the assistance,
and, furthermore, it is the religious entity that should make that ultimate determination, not the government.
A second alternative argument to the no-aid rule is that it prevents the competition, dissention, and discord among religious organizations that can have a corrosive
effect on the body politic. In his Memorial, Madison spoke about the “[t]orrents of
blood” that had been spilt because of “Religious discord.”206 Based on this long
history of interreligious conflict, the no-aid rule is designed to ensure social harmony
among religions and between religion and the state.207 Justice Breyer is a proponent
of a divisiveness rationale for Establishment Clause issues,208 and scholars have
noted this strain as well.209 According to Professor Ira Lupu, “[A] central function
of the Establishment Clause [is] to discourage religious factions from competing
with one another for political favor of any kind.”210
Although religious conflict and discord are particularly pernicious, the strength
of this argument is tempered by the reality of modern government benefits programs
that purportedly advance beneficial secular goals, rather than religious ones. Even the
Court’s conservatives have acknowledged that a financial benefits program limited
to religious recipients would be invalid—that the program goals must be neutral
with respect to religious and secular applicants.211 Thus, any dissension created by
204

Jefferson, supra note 107, at 77.
See Murray, supra note 6, at 28–35.
206
MADISON, supra note 111, at 5.
207
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 872 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[G]overnment
establishment of religion is inextricably linked with conflict.”).
208
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2282 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur history and federal constitutional precedent reflect a deep concern that state
funding for religious teaching, by stirring fears of preference or in other ways, might fuel religious discord and division and thereby threaten religious freedom itself.”); Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 723 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The principle underlying these
cases—avoiding religiously based social conflict—remains of great concern.”).
209
Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion
Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 361 (1996) (“Because state endorsement and discriminatory financial support are such potent advantages for any religious group seeking to
expand its power and dominion, minimizing the incentives for such groups to compete against
one another for state favor at all levels of government is of grave constitutional importance.”).
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Id. at 364.
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See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602–04 (1988).
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competition for a limited pool of grant monies will be shared by secular and religious
entities. Any Request for Proposals that privileged religion or a particular religion
over others would be per se invalid.212 To be sure, larger and better organized religious bodies may have an advantage in obtaining government grants, but it is chiefly
conjecture that the ongoing success of the Catholic Church in acquiring government
benefits, for example, will engender dissention and discord among smaller and less
structured Protestant bodies when the Catholic Church must also compete with
secular entities.213
These two arguments for the no-aid rule should not be discounted, but there is
a more compelling rationale for the rule, one that also allows for parties to bring
challenges to potential abuses. We turn once more to Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance for guidance and find that one ground for preventing public funding
of religious activity is that it is outside the authority of the government to do so.
Employing the concept of “jurisdiction,” Madison wrote that “Religion is wholly
exempt from [the] cognizance” of “Civil Society.”214 “[I]f religion be exempt from
the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative
Body.”215 In later writings, Madison employed related terms when discussing the idea:
Government had no “religious agency” because it was “no[t] part of the trust delegated to political rulers.”216 “[T]he immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction,” he
declared, had “always been a favorite principle with me.”217 Scholars have referred
to this concept in several ways: “noncognizance,”218 “religion blind,”219 “no agency,”220
or as a “structural restraint” on the government.221 Professor Vincent Philip Muñoz
argues that the notion of noncognizance is central not only to Madison’s Memorial,
but also to his overall philosophy of religious liberty. According to Professor Muñoz,
the principle of noncognizance means that a “state noncognizant of religion lacks
jurisdiction over religion. It may not take authoritative notice of or perceive religion
or the religious affiliation of its citizens. A government noncognizant of religion, in
other words, must be blind to religion.”222
212

See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (In administering benefits programs,
governments cannot “define its recipients by reference to religion.”).
213
See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617 n.14.
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MADISON, supra note 111, at 1–2.
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Id. at 2.
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James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 61, at 103, 105.
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Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 105, 105–06.
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See generally VINCENT PHILIP MUÑOZ, GOD AND THE FOUNDERS: MADISON,
WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON 11–48 (2009).
219
Id. at 12.
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See Sikkenga, supra note 48, at 747.
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See Esbeck, supra note 155, at 4.
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MUÑOZ, supra note 218, at 26.
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This idea that the government must be blind to the religious status of citizens
when it comes to the distribution of benefits and burdens finds it roots in Justice
Black’s Everson opinion223 and has fueled the Court’s embrace of government
neutrality toward religion.224 More recently in Trinity Lutheran, the Court reaffirmed
the constitutional concerns that exist when the government imposes “special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.”225 A “religion blind” version
of noncognizance, one that looks solely to the evenhanded application of a religionneutral benefits program226 and not to the likely applications of those government
funds, remains controversial,227 despite finding advocates among scholars and members
of the Court.228 Obviously aware of that controversy, in Trinity Lutheran Chief
Justice Roberts highlighted not only the neutral nature of the grant program but also
its clearly secular application.229
Rather than adopting a religion-blind interpretation of noncognizance, this Article advances a more nuanced understanding of Madison’s jurisdictional claim, one
that is consistent with the Founders’ concerns about government funding of inherently
religious activity. This jurisdictional claim is best represented by the phrase “no
agency”—that the government lacks the authority to act on religious matters. As one
scholar sums up this interpretation:
[G]overnment has no power to be a causal agent of religious
opinion or practice, whether by forming or acting on religious
opinion itself (establishment), by attempting to cause citizens to
223

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (remarking that the government “cannot
exclude . . . members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation”).
224
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (“[W]e have consistently turned to the
principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion.”).
225
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017)
(quoting Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
226
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (“[I]f the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately further
that purpose, . . . then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the
effect of furthering that secular purpose.”).
227
Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (decrying the “unprecedented breadth” of the plurality’s argument “that government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content.
The plurality also rejects the distinction between direct and indirect aid, and holds that the
actual diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the advancement of its religious mission
is permissible.”).
228
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
229
See id. at 2023 (majority opinion). An additional problem with a “religion blind” approach
is that it prevents the government from taking into account any special burdens that may befall
religious recipients under a neutral program that prevents any cognizance of religion.
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form or act on religious opinions (establishment), by trying to
force citizens to act against their religious conscience (free exercise), or by trying to prohibit them from acting on their conscience (free exercise) unless their religious practices are “adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.”230
I would add that government has no authority to use its financial resources to
advance inherently religious activity or to appropriate religious language and symbolism to advance governmental ends.231 Although supporters of religious establishments, such as their defenders in New England, disputed the idea that the state had
no interest in religion or jurisdiction over religious matters,232 in the end they were
on the losing side of that debate. The winners in that debate were Madison and
Jefferson, with the latter famously writing in his Notes on the State of Virginia that
“our rulers can have authority over such natural rights only as we have submitted to
them. The rights of conscience we never submitted . . . .”233
Another way of thinking about a no-agency understanding of the jurisdictional
claim is that the Establishment Clause acts as a structural restraint on the powers of
the government—that, in the case of funding religious activity, the Clause serves as
an express limitation on the otherwise broad authority Congress possesses under its
Article I, Section 8, spending power.234 Professor Carl Esbeck’s argument that the
Establishment Clause serves primarily as a structural restraint on other powers
contained in the Constitution is particularly helpful, though his schema is incomplete
in that it excludes any additional rights-protecting quality to the Clause which exists
to prevent specific government impositions on conscience.235 The Flast majority
acknowledged this structural restraint aspect to the Establishment Clause in stating
230

Sikkenga, supra note 48, at 746–47 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 130 (James
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)).
231
Professors Lupu and Tuttle describe this jurisdictional understanding thus: “Under the
nonestablishment principle, the state may not invoke religion as a source of civil authority;
must disclaim the comprehensive sweep of religion as a subject within the scope of civil
authority; and may not invoke the concept of worship as the character of citizens’ response
to civil authority.” LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 50, at 5.
232
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 722
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“Indeed, the right of a society or government to interfere
in matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons, who believe that piety, religion,
and morality are intimately connected with the well being of the state . . . .”).
233
JEFFERSON, supra note 149, at 159. The quotation continues: “[W]e could not submit.
We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to such
acts only as are injurious to others.”
234
LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 50, at 75, 109–12 (“[W]e believe that questions of the
permissibility of state funding of religious entities are far better understood through the lens
of jurisdictional disability.”).
235
See Esbeck, supra note 155, at 1–14.
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its second requirement for standing: that “the taxpayer must show that the challenged
enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of
the congressional taxing and spending power.”236 That led the Court to declare: “The
Establishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential
abuses of governmental power, and that clause of the First Amendment operates as
a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and
spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8.”237 In essence, Flast taxpayer standing
existed for the purpose of vindicating an exercise of power that exceeded the government’s authority, one that affected all citizens.238
Some may contest that the Establishment Clause, as historically understood and
applied, and as currently conceived, constitutes an express limitation on Congress’s
plenary authority to tax and spend for the general welfare; however, the logical
reading of the First Amendment and its sequencing in relation to the Anti-Federalists’
vocal concerns about the potential for abuse afforded by the purportedly unlimited
nature of that power supports an interpretation of the Clause as an express structural
restraint.239 When one combines that aspect with the near universal understanding
that government appropriations of tax monies for inherently religious activity constituted the defining quality of a religious establishment,240 then the no-agency
interpretation of the Establishment Clause gains strength.
The above understanding of no agency over religious matters does not mean that
the government is agnostic to religion, that it must ignore the potential applications
and consequences of religion in its funding programs. While the complementary notion
of noncognizance may imply that particular approach—that the government cannot
take into account the religious character of its grant recipients or their intended uses
of the aid—no-agency instructs that, because the government lacks jurisdiction over
religious matters, it must be aware of whether it has exceeded its authority in its
disbursements of government largesse. This does not mean that religious entities are
categorically excluded from participating in neutral funding programs—on the contrary,
to exclude an otherwise qualified applicant based solely on its religious identity would
potentially violate free exercise principles.241 It does mean, however, that the government is still responsible for determining whether its financial assistance is furthering
inherently religious activity. The majority in Trinity Lutheran appeared to acknowledge as much in signing off on the distinction between “status” and “use.”242 As with
236

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968).
Id. at 104.
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In its analysis of Flast, the Harvard Law Review noted the collective wrong that was being
vindicated by taxpayer plaintiffs acting as surrogates. Taxpayer Suits, supra note 181, at 229.
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See Timoleon, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 69, 69–70 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2015); An Old Whig, No. 5, in supra, at 70, 70–72.
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See CURRY, supra note 53, at 217; Esbeck, supra note 155, at 18–19.
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See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017).
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all financial disbursements, the government’s responsibility for how its funds are being
applied does not end with the exchange but requires accountability to ensure that public
funds are being appropriately spent in accordance with the government’s authority.243
When the government is aware that public funds are being spent in a way that is ultra
vires to its authority—or that an unauthorized use is the natural and foreseeable consequence of the grant award—then the government has exceeded that authority.244
Once the government has exceeded its authority of acting on a matter outside
of its jurisdiction by funding religious activity, then who may raise a challenge to
that action if Flast taxpayer standing no longer exists? The short answer is that standing
would vest in other applicants for and recipients of the grant at issue, particularly
those in the former category who lost out in a competitive bidding process to a recipient who applies the government monies toward inherently religious activity. These
unsuccessful applicants and other recipients (who have limited ability to acquire the
funds for non-religious uses) have an actual and particularized injury that qualifies
them to raise a claim that the government has exceeded its authority in funding
inherently religious activity.245 To be sure, the available class of potential plaintiffs
would be substantially smaller than the potential class of taxpayers. This could mean
that no qualified plaintiff would come forward and that some Establishment Clause
violations would go unvindicated. But in today’s litigious environment with public
interest organizations eager to provide legal representation to potential plaintiffs, the
number of unvindicated claims would likely be small.
So, what are the practical applications of this understanding of no agency over
religious matters? Outside the funding context, the Supreme Court has already tacitly
acknowledged at least one application, though more commonly through the modality
of free exercise. The long strain of “church autonomy” decisions, severely restricting
the authority of the government to regulate the internal operations of houses of worship,
properly understood not as excluding any particular entity (status) but excluding those entities
that choose to integrate religious devotional activity into their funded programs (use), such that
the government is financially advancing religious activity.
243
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 691–92 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(discussing the government’s responsibility for ensuring that public monies are not diverted
for religious uses).
244
In essence, the no-agency principle is violated when the government acts with an invalid
purpose: to advance inherently religious activity. It is also violated when the government acts
with an arguably valid secular purpose designed to produce a non-religious end, but it is both
foreseeable and probable that the result will advance inherently religious activity. This awareness of the probable application thus indicates an invalid purpose of exceeding the government’s jurisdiction.
245
Continuing with the standing requirements of causation and redressability, this assumes
a competitive process with a limited pool of available funds, such that the plaintiffs’ injuries
(i.e., denial of a grant or a self-limitation on the application of the funds) are traceable to the
unconstitutional use by other recipients. A judicial ruling forbidding the religious uses would
supply the remedy.
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fits within this understanding. That would include ministerial exemption cases like
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.246 The caveat that this Article has attempted to maintain
is that the no-agency rule limits the government’s authority to advance (or inhibit)
inherently religious activity which, as discussed, allows religiously affiliated entities
to participate in neutral funding programs that enhance secular outcomes and do not
run the risk of government monies supporting inherently religious activities. The
converse exists for the category of church autonomy cases—that the claimed areas
of exemption must involve inherently religious functions.247 So the holding in
Hosanna-Tabor is essentially correct as the government has no authority to direct
the qualifications of a faith community’s leadership. But the no-agency rule would
not necessarily restrict the enforcement of non-discrimination laws to protect employees
of religious entities that are not engaged in inherently religious activity.248 Admittedly, that line is not clear, but the distinction is offered here for the purposes of
example. I leave it to other commentators to deconstruct the intricacies of the Court’s
recent holding in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.249
Within the funding context, the proposed no-agency rule would apply as follows.
As stated, the government has no authority to distribute monies to advance inherently religious activity.250 That means that government funding programs must be
generally available to secular and religious recipients alike and must advance identifiably secular activity. Further, no agency means that the applications of government
funds must be designed in such a way that they cannot be used for religious purposes
(a “non-divertible” rule).251 As a general matter, the government is always responsible not only for the goals of any program but also for how those funding goals are
ultimately applied; government accountability requires nothing less. To restrict the
no-agency jurisdiction principle to the design of a program but not to likely applications would allow the government to easily circumvent its limited jurisdiction and
would make a mockery of the rule.
Therefore, as stated in the introduction, the Court’s holding in Trinity Lutheran
is consistent with the no-agency rule, notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor’s moving
246

565 U.S. 171, 172 (2012).
Id. at 192 (noting that the teacher performed “important religious functions” for the
church).
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See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 305–06 (1985).
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July 8, 2020).
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Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) (“[G]overnment inculcation of religious
beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancing religion.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the Court’s
decisions “provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities”).
251
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing
the plurality’s sole reliance on the neutrality of a program’s design, noting that “we have long
been concerned that secular government aid not be diverted to the advancement of religion”).
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dissent.252 Like textbooks and teaching materials given to religious schools, the
Missouri grant funded an identifiably secular item—the purchase of recycled tires
for playground resurfacing—an item that could not be diverted for any inherently
religious activity.253 Despite the benefit being “cash” and flowing directly to a house
of worship—two lines that had not been crossed in previous Court decisions, though
suggested—the grant program did not rely on authority outside the state’s jurisdiction that would otherwise be limited by the concept of no-agency. For the no-aid
rule, Trinity Lutheran is an easy case.
Under the proposed no-agency rule, Zelman should also have been an easy case,
though with a different outcome. Notwithstanding the claimed neutral design of the
Cleveland voucher program and putative presence of “genuine and independent
private choice” that determined the ultimate application of the funds, the program
violated the no-agency rule because of the inevitable funding of inherently religious
activity.254 This is not to relitigate Zelman,255 but Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formalistic
opinion obfuscated several important facts: that the Ohio legislators knew that no
neighboring public schools would accept the vouchers, which undermined the neutrality of the program; and that the parents’ “private choice” was neither genuine—in
that ninety-six percent of the available uses of a voucher were at religious schools—
nor independent—in that the parents never acquired an independent property interest
in the voucher monies to direct their application, but rather they served as conduits
for the transfer of public funds to religious schools.256 Facing the reality that public
monies would aid inherently religious activity by funding religious instruction and
that this would be the natural and probable consequence of the voucher program, the
Ohio legislature exceeded its jurisdiction in enacting the program.
Under the proposed no-agency rule, another decision that was wrongly decided was
Bowen v. Kendrick.257 Bowen considered the constitutionality of the 1981 Adolescent
Family Life Act (AFLA), which provided federal funding to nonprofit counseling
agencies to supply services to address adolescent sexuality and pregnancy.258 The
district court found that AFLA expressly required grant applicants to describe how
they would involve religious organizations in the programs funded by the government
and that AFLA allowed “religiously affiliated grantees to teach adolescents on issues
that can be considered ‘fundamental elements of religious doctrine.’”259 AFLA did this
252

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2027 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
253
Id. at 2017 (majority opinion).
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 691–92 (2002).
255
In full disclosure, I served as co-counsel for the respondents Simmons-Harris in Zelman.
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See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 694–707 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disputing both the neutrality
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See generally 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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Id. at 593.
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Id. at 598, 604.
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“without imposing any restriction whatsoever against the teaching of ‘religion qua
religion’ or the inculcation of religious beliefs in federally funded programs.”260 The
Court majority did not dispute these facts but, after limiting its review to that of a
facial challenge, upheld AFLA.261 The Court disputed that AFLA had the primary
effect of advancing religious activity merely because some grant recipients were
religious and the abstinence and non-abortion goals of the program coincided with
the doctrinal beliefs of those recipients.262 The majority held that because the funded
projects were facially neutral, they were “not themselves ‘specifically religious activities,’ and they [were] not converted into such activities by the fact that they are
carried out by organizations with religious affiliations.”263 In so holding, the Court
ignored evidence supporting the strong likelihood that public monies would fund
counseling and other services laced with religious doctrine, particularly in light of
AFLA’s failure to prohibit religious providers from integrating religious dogma into
its services.264 The no-agency rule, which limits the government’s jurisdiction to
advance inherently religious activity, does not allow the government to be blind to
probable applications of its disbursements.
The harder question involves a neutral funding program where “genuine and
independent private choice” truly exists and where there are no incentives to apply
government funds for religious purposes. A program like the vocational rehabilitation scholarship in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
where a recipient qualifies for the grant on neutral criteria and faces a wide variety
of alternatives for using the grant, with only a small percentage being religious,265
raises few questions whether the government has exceeded its jurisdiction in enacting the program based on potentially one or two religious uses.266 One could argue
if a particular recipient’s use of a neutral grant for inherently religious activity is not
the natural and probable consequences of the aid program, then the government has
not exceeded its jurisdiction or acted in a manner in which it has no agency. Understandably, some may hesitate to have a constitutional rule turn on the foreseeability
of applications. One response is that a legislature is under an obligation when drafting
the requirements of an aid program to consider its possible or probable applications.
260

Id. at 599.
See id. at 602–18.
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264
Id. at 638–42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, the district court concluded that “[t]he
record demonstrates that some grantees have included explicitly religious materials, or a
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in their HHS-approved grant proposals.” Id. at 635 n.7.
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The majority noted that Larry Witters’s requested use of the scholarship represented
a unique situation. Id. at 487–89.
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At a minimum, the latter consideration (probability) should be part of any legislative
drafting enterprise, particularly in areas of education and social services.267 The
statute involved in Locke v. Davey268 possibly offers a “best practices” example. There,
the state-funded “Promise Scholarship” program provided a grant to qualified recipients to assist with tuition to any in-state college, including private and religious
colleges, but contained a prohibition on the scholarship being used to fund a degree
program in devotional theology.269 In drafting the authorizing statute, the state
legislature was likely aware of such a possible application of the scholarship and
acted to prevent it.270 Relying on a no-funding provision in the state constitution, the
legislature understood that it needed to exclude a probable religious application of
the scholarship so as not to exceed its authority under the constitution.
So, would any private choice funding scheme that includes only possible (but
not probable) religious applications satisfy the no-agency jurisdiction rule? At first,
as stated, the neutral program would need to be one that offered truly “genuine and
independent private choice,”271 not one weighted toward religious uses but one that
provided predominately secular applications. That government monies would end up
paying for inherently religious activity would need to be an unlikely and unintended
consequence. The recipient would also need to exercise significant control over the
application of the funds. An example that comes to mind would be a program modeled
on a modified version of the one considered in Mueller v. Allen.272 Assume a state
offered a tax credit to assist middle- and lower-income parents with expenses associated with educating their children.273 The tax credit is capped at $500 per child and
allows parents to bundle various expenses related to education—sports equipment,
computers, musical instruments, instructional supplies, etc., including various types
of fees for tuition, tutoring, lessons, and the like. Parents of children in both public
and private schools can select from a wide menu of options, and even those parents
with children attending religious schools may likely accumulate $500 in secular
expenses without needing to rely on their child’s tuition to her school. In any given
year, parents with a child in a religious school may or may not apply religious school
tuition toward their credit. Has the state in enacting this tax credit exceeded its
authority based on the possibility that any parent may include religious school tuition,
rather than hockey equipment, under the credit? Funding of inherently religious activity
267
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does not seem to be the natural and probable consequences of the law. The program
would not exceed the jurisdiction of the state nor transgress the no-agency rule.
CONCLUSION
Protecting the right of religious conscience is a core function of the Religion
Clauses. Coercing someone to attend, endorse, or support any religion—even of
one’s own choosing—violates the Free Exercise Clause and exceeds the government’s authority under the Establishment Clause. This is axiomatic. And so, for
example, a supervisor in a government agency could not require his subordinates to
attend a brief morning prayer meeting. Freedom of conscience—religious and nonreligious—is also impacted when the government requires a person to financially
support an ideological cause to which that person is conscientiously opposed.
Accordingly, recognizing a strain of a taxpayer conscience for Establishment
Clause violations makes sense, but only in a limited context. That context would be
one analogous to what existed with colonial and early state religious establishments
where officials extracted a specific tax or assessment in support of religion qua
religion. This scenario would be highly unlikely under today’s modern taxing structure,
but may still be possible. In contrast, a conscience claim evaporates when the government disburses monies from general tax revenues that may end up benefitting a
religious institution; the injury to one’s conscience from such disbursements is too
tenuous and abstract. While the taxpayer conscience rationale for an Establishment
Clause violation made sense in the late eighteenth century, it makes no sense today
as the basis for the no-aid rule. And if the taxpayer conscience rationale makes no
sense, then neither does Flast taxpayer standing.274
This Article has proposed an alternative theory for the no-aid rule: a no-agency
rule that recognizes that the government lacks jurisdiction to support or advance
inherently religious activity. It is, however, not a “religion blind” form of no-agency
but one in which the government acts with awareness of the natural and probable
consequences of its financial disbursements, even under a neutral funding program.
This no-agency approach is consistent with the vision of Madison and Jefferson and
represents a more honest foundation for enforcing the no-aid to religion principle
that is embedded in the Establishment Clause. Granted, the sweep of the proposed
no-agency rule may not be as great as traditional no-aid separationism; yet, it is consistent with the historical underpinnings of the no-establishment of religion principle
and is more applicable to the modern welfare state than a rule based on an anachronistic taxpayer conscience rationale.
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